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Introduction

D

uring Labor Day weekend 2005, Hurricane Katrina had its own impact in
Colorado Springs. Colorado. Over 100 men and women worked at a feverish pace in the loint Operations Center and the Combined Intelligence Fusion
Center at US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) as New Orleans residents were
threatened by floodwate rs creeping up to their rooftop safe havens. Similar scenarios were repeated for days.
As this was the first time within the United States that a natural disaster of this
proportion had involved NORTH COM, unique issues arose regarding the use of
Department of Defense (000 ) resources and capabilities in support of hurricane
relief operations within the United States. This article discusses NORTHCOM's
missions, authorities and significant legal issues associated with defense support of
civil authorities during disaster relief operations.

Dual Missions
NORTH COM is a uniq ue geographic combatant command as it has dual missionshomeland defense (HLD ) and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA)-that
must be performed in our nation's hom eland. The legal authority for
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NORTHCOM's HiD mission is rooted in Article II, Section 2 of the US Constitution: the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief. The legal authority for the
DSCA mission is based in statute. An example is the Stafford Act. I

Legal A uthorities
Stafford Act
The Stafford Act is the primary legal authority for federal emergency and disaster
assistance to state, local and tribal governments. Under the Act, federal disaster relief may be initiated in four circumstances:
a. Presidential declaration of a major disaster 2 at the request of a governor,)
b. Presidential declaration of an emergencr at the request of a governor,s
c. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) utilization of DoD resources, upon
request of a governor and at the direction of the President, to perform
emergency work for the preservation of life and property during the
immediate aftermath of an incident (before the President makes a major
disaster or emergency declaration ),/) or
d. Presidential declaration of an emergency when the affected area is one in
which "the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility
and authority" under the Constitution or laws of the United States. 7 The
President may make this declaration on his own volition without a
governor's request.
In the first two circwnstances, the Stafford Act requires that the governor of an
affected state request a presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency.
The governor's request must be based on a finding that the disaster "is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the state
and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is necessary."8 The
governor must certify that he or she has executed the state's emergency plan and
will comply with the cost-sharing requirements of the Stafford Act. The President
may then declare that a major disaster or emergency exists.
Upon the declaration of a major disaster or emergency, the governor and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Regional Director execute a
FEMA-state agreement. 9 The agreement describes the incident, the period for
which assistance will be made available, and the type and extent of the federal assistance. It also contains the commitment of the state and local government(s) with
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respect to the amount offunds to be expended. An emergency is an event that does
not qualify under the definition of major disaster. 10 Assistance authorized by an
em ergency declaration is limited to immediate and short-term assistance essential
to save lives, to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen o r avert
the threat of a catastrophe. II Total assistance provided in any given emergency declaration m ay not exceed five million dollars, except when FEMA determines that
continued emergency assistance is immediately required; there is a continwngand
immediate risk to lives, property, public health and safety; and necessary assistance
will not otherwise be provided on a timely basis.12
The third circumstance occurs in the immediate aftermath of an incident which
may ultimately qualify for Stafford Act assistance but before the President actually
makes a major disaster o r emergency declaration. The governor m ay request DoD
resources to perform emergency work on public and private lands that is essential
for the preservation oflife and property.l3 "Em ergency work" is defined as including "clearance and removal of debris and wreckage and temporary restoration of
essential public facili ties and services,"14 but may also include search and rescue,
em ergency medical care and reduction of immediate threats to life, property and
public health and safety. IS
The fourth circum stance that initiates federal d isaster relief does not require a
request from a governor. If> The President may declare an em ergency and provide
federal assistance to the governor when the affected area is one in which "the
United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority."17
The President is required to consult the governor, if practicable, to determine if an
em ergency exists. President Clinton exercised this authority in the aftermath of the
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. II! lbis was
the first and only use of this authority since its inception in 1988 and was likely used
because the Murrah was a federal building housing multiple federal agencies.
In com paring the power of the federal government with that of the states in
terms of disaster response and assistance, one must consider the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution, which reads, "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." State and local governments derive their
authority to respond to disasters and em ergencies and to enforce law from their
" police power," which is inherent in the sovereignty of every state and is reserved to
the states through the Tenth Amendment. The Stafford Act affirms the primacy of
the state's role in disaster response, because federal assistance is premised on a request from the state governor and is not imposed on the state, except in those cases
where the federal government exercises exclusive or preeminent authority over the
area affected.
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NORTH COM's dual missions present an interesting spectrum of author ity
within which to act. The line between civil support and homeland defense is not
easily distinguishable and often one leads into, or overlaps with, the other. In responding to a major disaster or emergency, authorities must decide if DoD's role is
one of civil support or homeland defense, which of course depends on the nature
of the major disaster or emergency. One can think of a number of scenarios where
this determination could go either way. Without limiting DoD's national defense
mission, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD ) 5 establishes a presumption that domestic incidents including "terrorist attacks, major disasters, and
other emergencies" shall be addressed by the US government in a single, com prehensive response, with the Secretary of Homeland Security acting as principal federal official and coordinating all federal operations in response and recovery.19
National Response plan
Where DoD's civil support mission is dear, it begins with the National Response
Plan (NRP).2o Under the NRP, incidents begin as local events with local police, fire
and emergency medical services as the first responders. If these first responders are
overwhelmed, they request assistance from the governor of the state. The governor
may choose to deploy hislher state's National Guard to assist, and may also rely on
assistance from other states if an Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC) exists.
An EMAC is an agreement among member states that outlines the legal agreements and procedures for providing assistance to other member states in the event
of an emergency or disaster. It was established in 1996, has weathered the storm
when put to the test, and stands today as the cornerstone of mutual aid. The EMAC
mutual aid agreement and partnership between states exist because from hurricanes to earthquakes, wildfires to toxic waste spills, and terrorist attacks to biological and chemical incidents, all states share a common enemy: the threat of disaster.
Since being ratified by Congress and signed into law in 1996,50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted legislation to
become members of EMAC. EMAC is the first national disaster-relief compact to
be ratified by Congress since the Civil Defense and Disaster Compact of 1950.
The strength of an EMAC and the quality that distinguishes it fro m other plans
and compacts lies in its governance structure, its relationship with federal organizations, states, counties, territories and regions, and the ability to move just about
any resource one state has to assist another state, including medical resources.
If the state is overwhelmed or the governor determines specific assistance is
needed from the federal government, the governor will call the President or his
staff and request a declaration of major disaster or emergency. The President will
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turn to the Secretary of Homeland Security, who will take the appropriate action
for incident management. The primary federal agency, most often FEMA, may request military support through the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Director of Military Support ODOMS) will evaluate the request based on legality,
lethality, risk, readiness, budget and appropriateness. 21 If approved, SECDEF will
give the mission to NORTH COM and NORTH COM will support the primary federal agency as directed. It should be clearly understood that the National Response
Plan is only a plan. It does not provide statutory authority under which DoD may
expend federal funds and take action.
Posse Comitatus Act
Although civil support within the homeland is not new to the military, the nature
of support needed during the 2005 hurricane season presented some unique issues
for NORTHCOM. Whenever military operations are conducted within the homeland, authorities must consider the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).22 Since the Constitution leaves police power to the states, the PCA ensures that the Army and Air
Force are not used as a police power. The PCA applies to the Navy and Marine
Corps by DoD policy. The PCA restrictions essentially prohibit the direct, active
participation of military forces in enforcing civil criminal laws. This includes prohibitions against arrest, search and seizure, and detention. The PCA does not apply
to the Coast Guard. 23 It also does not apply to the National Guard in state active
duty (SAD) or Title 32 (Federally Funded) statuses. Congress has provided many
exceptions to the PCA, most notably the Insurrection Act.24 Although there has
been much discussion of amending the PCA, NORTHCOM's position is that its
ability to execute its mission is not adversely affected by PCA restrictions.
Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order
Thelohn Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (NOAA
FY07) changed the name of chapter 15 ofTitle 10 from "Insurrection" to "Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order."2S Formerly and commonly referred to
as the Insurrection Act statutes, 10 US Code 33 1-333 provides statutory exceptions
to the PCA that could involve the execution of NORTHCOM's civil support mission. During Hurricane Katrina, early news coverage depicted a city oflawlessness:
police were gone, looting was common and violence was rampant. This news coverage led to discussions about whether the President should invoke the Insurrection Act. As the Insurrection Act statutes existed at the time of the Hurricane
Katrina disaster, it did not appear that legal authority existed fo r the President to
invoke the Insurrection Act.
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The Insurrection Act statutes describe three triggers that allow the President to
use military force to suppress insurrections. The first trigger is a state request, as
was done in the 1992 Los Angeles riotS. 26 The second trigger is when un1awful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the
United States make it impracticable to enforce federallaw.27 This was done in the
1957 and 1963 public school desegregation cases. The third trigger, now expanded
as a result oflanguage in the Fiscal Year 07 National Defense Authorization Act, allows the President to restore public order and enforce the laws of the United States
when, as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health
emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition in any State or possession of the United States, the President determines that domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the authorities of the State or possession are incapable
of maintaining public order, and such violence results in a condition that deprives
the people of constitutional rights or obstructs execution of US laws. 28 The President may also do so to suppress in a state any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if such insurrection, violation, combination or
conspiracy results in a condition that deprives the people of constitutional rights or
obstructs execution of US laws.
Where the President invokes the "Laws to Restore Public Order" because public
order cannot be maintained and the violence deprives people of constitutional
rights, the President may federalize the National Guard and Reserve for not more
than 365 days. He may also direct SECDEF to provide supplies, services and equipment to affected persons (independent of the normal process under the Stafford Act).
Although the new provisions of the NOAA FY07 expanded the President's authority, the provisions would not necessarily have completely addressed the "lawlessness" situation that existed in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina. Under
the new provisions, the President would have had two significant hurdles to overcome before he could invoke the "Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order" provisions that now exist and send in Title 10 troops over the objection of or
absent a request from the governor. While the first hurdle would have been met
(authority to act in public emergencies such as natural disaster) in the absence of
effective government, the second hurdle (finding deprivation of constitutional
rights) would arguably still have presented problems. Although Katrina-like situations are now clearly contemplated in statute, the President must still find an associated deprivation of constitutional rights. No President since 1963 (public school
desegregation ) has been willing to make such a finding.
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Unity of Effort
As stated earlier, the federal government's ability to respond to an emergency is
constrained by the constitutional provisions which reserve police power to the
states. The states have authority to call forth militias (the National Guard) to suppress insurrections, quell civil disturbances or respond to natural disasters and
other catastrophic events. Given that each state sovereign has its own militia, it is
impossible for Title 10 forces in the homeland to achieve unity of command with a
state's militia. However, unity of effort is a goal that can be achieved through improved communication and coordination. The "Forces for Unified Commands"
memorandum 29 envisions the establishment of a "coordinating authority" between Title 10 forces and non-federalized National Guard fo rces so that this unity
of effort may be achieved. This authority is not command authority or authority to
compel agreement, but rather authority delegated to a commander for coordinating specific functions and activities involving two or more forces. It is an authority
to require consultation. This type of coordination would give SECDEF insight into
how Title 32 funds are spent and give NORTHCOM and the National Guard situational awareness of each other's missions, locations, platforms, capabilities and
rules for the use of force, promoting unity of effort among all forces. This coordination cou1d be a condition precedent to SECDEF approval of Title 32 funding.
Dual-Status Commander
Another way to achieve unity of effort is through the establishment of a dual-status
commander, a command arrangement discussed, but not used, during the 2005
hurricane season. There are two types of dual-status commanders. One involves
providing a Title 10 officer a commission in a state National Guard thereby allowing him or her to exercise command and control over federal status (Title 10)
forces and state status (Title 32JSAD) National Guard forces. The other involves
placing a National Guard officer on Title 10 orders, while allowing that officer to
retain his or her state authority, thereby enabling unity of command of both federal and state status forces.
32 US Code 3 15 authorizes the detail of regular members of the Army and Air
Force to duty with a state National Guard by the Secretary of the Army or Secretary
of the Air Force. With permission of the President, it allows an Army or Air Force
officer to accept a commission in the National Guard if such is offered by the governorof the respective state. This authority has been used to authorize Title 10 officers to exercise command and control over National Guard units.
32 US Code 325 authorizes a National Guard officer familiar with the state and
local area of operations to command in both a federal and state status. This authority was used in the 2004 G8 Summit, the 2004 Democratic and Republican national
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conventions and Operation W inter Freeze, a five-month NORTHCOM mission in
late 2004 and early 2005, which occurred on the northeast border of the United
States. This is also the command arrangement that will be used for the Ground Based
Midcourse Missile Defense units of the Colorado and Alaska National Guards.
Both options provide unity of effort, rather than unity of command, allowing
both federal and state military forces to enhance their situational awareness.
There is no formal approval process for either situation. It usually begins with
informal coordination between the state and NORTHCOM. Typically, action officers at NORTH COM and the National Guard discuss various courses of action
with a recommendation for the use of a dual-status commander. Then the state
National Guard staff and NORTHCOM staff determine whether to seek approval
from their respective chains of command. In all four 2004 events in which dualstatus National Guard officer arrangements were approved, the governor sent an
approval package, including a signed Memorandum of Agreement, to the President and/or SECDEF for signature (for certain events, the President has delegated
approval to SECDEF).
The dual-status commander arrangement does not simultaneously authorize
the use of Title 32 funding30 for National Guard forces for operational missions.
Title 32 funding approval is a separate process. Moreover, this arrangement does
not "'dual status" the forces or staff, whether federal or state status, commanded by
the dual-status commander. The dual-status commander has two reporting chains
and must consider the implications of the different rules and restrictions for each
force under his or her command. It is likewise important that staff members,
whether Title 10 or National Guard, understand their separate roles and missions.
DoD as Lead Federal Agency
Could DoD ever be tasked by the President to be the lead federal agency in a catastrophic event? Clearly, the Homeland Security Act of2oo231 confers statutory responsibility for federal response to catastrophic incidents to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). One could argue that DoD could lead a component of
the federal response as long as DHS maintained overall responsibility for the response as a whole. One could also conceive of a situation in which an incident is of
such magnitude as to jeopardize national security, such that the President, under
his Article II authority, could place DoD in the lead.
Conceptually, there is a critical void in the immediate aftermath of a major disaster (for discussion purposes, the first 48-72 hours after a disaster). Conceivably,
local responders are incapacitated or busy attending to their own families; state assistance is forthcoming, but will take time to assemble sufficient National Guard
forces and other responders into effective units; the governor has not yet requested
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federal assistance or, if requested, it will take a short period oftime for the National
Response Plan to gear up and provide that assistance. In the meantime, American
lives are at risk. DoD has the capability to respond quickly with well-trained units
in constant communications unaffected by the disaster, and to sustain itself indefinitely. The overarching question is whether 000 has legal authority to fill that
early and critical void.
Immediate Response Authority
There are situations that allow DoD to respond without prior approval from the
chain of command. When imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil
emergency or attack exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher
headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials of other 000
components are authorized to take necessary and immediate action to respond to
requests of domestic civil authorities in order "to save lives, prevent human suffering or mitigate great property damage." Such actions are generally referred to as
"immediate response."32
Ordinarily, assistance to civilian authorities is provided on a cost reimbursement basis. However, it should not be delayed or denied because of the inability or
unwillingness of the requester to make a commitment to reimburse 000. Additionally, those providing immediate response are required to notify the National
Milital)' Command Center (NMCC), through the chain of command, as soon as
practical of the request for assistance, the nat ure of the response and any other relevant information related to assistance provided.
Generally, notice should reach the NMCC within hours of the decision to provide assistance. Immediate response has generally been contemplated as assistance
provided in response to a natural disaster or other catastrophic incident. The assistance provided is in support oflocal officials and at their request. This response is
generally limited in terms of time and geographic proximity of the commander
and/or the requested capability to the incident.
Incident Awareness and Assessment
One of the most sensitive issues in the homeland is the use of intelligence assets
during domestic operations. Consider the ramifications of fl ying a U -2 reconnaissance plane over the Gulf Coast during hurricane disaster relief operations. Beyond
perceptions, one must consider if there is authority to use intelligence capabilities
for non-intelligence missions (such as search and rescue and damage assessment)
following a natural disaster. "Incident Awareness and Assessment" (lAA) is the
term used to describe the use of intelligence assets, specifically intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, in support of disaster relief operations.
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Foreign intelligence (FI) and counterintelligence (CI) are the only authorized
"intelligence activities" of the DoD intelligence community and must be conducted consistent with DoD Directive 5240.1 and DoD 5240.1-R.33 In essence, this
means that whenever DoD conducts an "intelligence activity," there must be a foreign nexus, as required by the defmitions of foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence. DoD intelligence community officials have opined that
SECDEF may approve use of DoD intelligence component capabilities for missions "other than intelligence activities" because the SECDEF has inherent authority to use any assets or personnel within the DoD to complete a DoD mission. In
those instances, the mission must be a valid DoD mission, and SECDEF must approve both the mission and specific use of the DoD intelligence component
capabilities.
Essentially, in order to use DoD intelligence component capabilities (personnel,
units, planning, collection, analysis, production) for non-intelligence activities,
there must be a Request for Forces (RFF) submitted through the command to the
loint Staff for review and approval by SECDEF. The request must identify the mission and specify the DoD intelligence component capability requested. The resulting execute order will be approved by SECDEF and specify what DoD intelligence
component capabilities may be used and any operational parameters or limitations
on the use of that capability.
These procedures give SECDEF the Oexibility to use DoD assets for d ual missions. For example, during a hurricane disaster support mission, the DoD intelligence components could be conducting intelligence activities (Fl and Cl) under
existing authorities. Additionally, DoD intelligence component capabilities could
be used for a non-intelligence mission by doing planning, tasking, analysis and
production in support of search and rescue (SAR) and damage assessment. The
second mission could involve a Request for Assistance (RFA) from a primary federal agency to DoD. In this situation, SECDEF approval would authorize the use of
intelligence assets for non-intelligence purposes. Mission direction would be coordinated with the primary federal agency. Additionally, the RFA process is a "fee for
service" operation. The primary federal agency would agree to pay fo r the cost of
the lAA employment.
Leaders, at all levels, freq uently seek to build situational awareness. Building situational awareness requires data to be collected by a combination of satellite, airborne, and ground sensors. The key is to create a means to bring all of this disparate
data together into one coherent picture for decisionmakers and planners. The
amount and type of data required differs depending on whether the leader is making strategic, operational or first responder decisions. The requirement for
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situational awareness m ust be evaluated carefully, so that IAA assets are efficiently
and effectively used.
Sensitive Information
The use of information about US persons and non-DoD persons and organizations
is restricted depending on the mission of the DoD com ponent involved. During disaster relief operations, force protection is always a concern when sending troops
into a joint operating area. While this is true whether operating overseas or in the
homeland, the rules in the homeland are more restrictive. Sensitive information
falls into two major categories. The first category deals with information on US
persons subject to intelligence oversight (IO) rules. The rules fo r this categol)' of
information apply only to DoD intelligence components.:J.f The second category
deals with information concerning the activities of persons and organizations not
affiliated with 000. The rules for this category apply to everyone except DoD intelligence components. The policy set forth in a 1980 directive, DoD Directive
5200.27, applies. 35
The general rule fo r this second category is that collecting, reporting, processing
or storing information concerning individ uals or organizations not affiliated with
DoD is not permitted. This includes non-DoD persons/organizations within the
50 states, the D istrict of Columbia, Puerto Rico, US territories and non -DoD affiliated US citizens anywhere in the world. There are exceptions to the general rule.
Information may be gathered if it is essential to the accomplishment of the following defense missions:
• Protection of DoD functions and property. Th is exception encompasses
threats to DoD military and civilian personnel and defense activities, installations
and property. Only the following activities justify acquisition of non-DoD
persons/organizations info rmation :
• Subversion of loyalty, discipline or morale of DoD milital)' or civilian
personnel by encouraging violations of law, disobedience of orders or
disruption of m ilitary activities;
• Theft of arms, ammunition or equipment; or destruction or sabotage
of DoD facil ities, equipment or records;
• Unauthorized demonstrations on DoD active or reserve installations;
• Direct threats to DoD military/civilian personnel in connection with
their duties or to other persons authorized protection by DoD resources;
• Activities endangering facilities that have classified defense contracts
or that have been officially designated as "key defense facili ties"; and
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• Crimes for which DoD has responsibility for investigating or
prosecuting.
Personnel security. Investigations regarding clearances for members of DoD
and DoD applicants and persons needing access to classified information.
• Operations related to civil disturbances. If specifically authorized by
SECDEF and there is a distinct threat of civil disturbance exceeding the law
enforcement capabili ty of state and local authorities.
Information collected under DoD Directive 5200.27 authority must be destroyed within 90 days unless retention is otherwise authorized. The dilemma is
drawing the line between information needed fo r fo rce protection purposes and
information that is more appropriately handled by local law enforcement.
International Assistance
The United States has extensive experience providing assistance to other nations in
the wake of disasters, but there is little recent precedent for the United States to receive international assistance following a homeland disaster. During Hurricane
Katrina, many foreign countries offered assistance. For example, Canada sent
ground troops, Mexico sent a mobile kitchen to provide food , and Germany and
Denmark offered water pumps. Federal regulations, however, hindered the provision of the assistance in some cases. US Department of Agricult ure reguJations prevented the use of food from foreign nations whose health regulations did not meet
US standards. In addition, the process to accept these "gifts" of assistance often
meant assistance did not come as quickly as it was needed. In the case of foreign
troops on the ground assisting in relief efforts, issues regarding the rules under
which they would operate arose. Examples include rules for the use of force and
medical credentials. The United States clearly has to resolve these issues as the paradigm of international assistance has changed.

Conclusion
As new hurricane seasons approach, NORTH COM will continue to grapple with
these legal issues and others that arise from various manmade and natural disaster
relief situations. While homeland defense is NORTH COM's number one responsibility, the mission to support civil authorities is very important, and often at the
forefront ofNORTHCOM's daily activities. NORTH COM is called upon on a reguJar basis to assist other federal agencies in responding to natural and man-made
disasters at the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense. Because DoD
support is often unique, NORTH COM will continue to coordinate with federal,
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state and local authorities to provide assistance. as directed. whenever and wherever it is needed.
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